Due to a poor capital standard some depository institutions (DIs) 
Introduction
Cooperative concept has ample prospects that can contribute for poverty reduction, mutual growth, financial stability and overall development of an economy. Nepalese cooperative (NC) movement began with the objective of uplifting the socio economic status of the underprivileged rural people. Mainly, poor and illiterate people from rural areas become members in a cooperative society in order to get access to capital market with benefit sharing (Bharadwaj, 2012) . A mushrooming growth of cooperative took place after restoration of democracy in 1990. In 1992, new cooperative act was enacted, and democratic government of Nepal adopted liberal economic policy. As a result, 4,555,286 cooperative members are collaborated up to the end of fiscal year 2013/14 in 31,177 cooperative societies (Statistics of Cooperative Enterprises, 2014) . Currently, some highly recognized businesses also joined cooperatives, and it becomes a wonderful business model in urban area. Although, performance of enterprising cooperatives has increased due to capital access, risk sharing, and community support, it has also increased caution for unethical issues such as adverse selection problem, lack of transparency, misuse of funds and poor governance system. Therefore, failure of some large and reputable cooperatives has experienced recently (Karki et al., 2013) .
Though fundamental framework of cooperative differs from a depository institution (DI) like commercial bank, NCs such as savings and credits (SAC), multipurpose (MPC), etc. are doing fund intermediating business like DIs. The health of a DI is affected by a number of operational risks such as investment risk, solvency risk, liquidity risk, etc. (Anuj, 2011) . Moreover, DIs are highly levered firm since those capital structures are represented by major percent of debt collected from deposits. In addition to this, DIs such as commercial bank, development bank, etc. have implemented the Basel II accord since they are subjected to the central bank regulation (HallCalem & LaCour-Little, 2004; Avery & Berger, 1991) . This helps to maintain a proper amount of adequate permanent capital to them, and prevents from default risk arises due to credit risk, solvency risk, investment risk and so on. But in case of cooperative societies, Basel provisions are not mandatory to apply which will provide a prominent space for unethical practices inside cooperative. Moreover, the situation may lead to adverse effects such as the depositors losing their money, lose of members' confident in the cooperative system, and may result financial instability (Kithinji, 2010) . In this case, the concern should be taken due consideration for protecting what we have now from a probable default of cooperative sectors. Therefore, it is crucial to study the capital adequacy ratio (CAR) of cooperatives, so that, we can seek a strategic strength of cooperative societies.
Recent failure of DI due to mismanagement of capital standards has raised a considerable interest to regulators, managers, researchers, etc., and has induced to maintain a precise level of the strategic capital requirements. CAR is significant measure to evaluate the efficiency and stability in a DI which affects the likelihood of its insolvency (Bateni et al., 2014, p 109) . Similarly, a DI should keep CAR above a specific level, so that, it can facilitate financial stability, else it may result risks and bankruptcy (Abusharba et al., 2014) . The CAR may differ in banking industry from time to time or from firm to firm. This might be due to various reasons. A wrong financing decision leads to wrong capital structure resulting high debt ratio, and a wrong investment decision leads to loan default and profit decrement which is the sources of long term capital.
A regulation of capital requirement should be done to ensure that the risk exposures of financial institutions are founded by an adequate amount of worthy capital. The apprehension of a regulator is to guarantee assets quality and fund availability of DIs to meet claims of depositors in liquidation (Abusharba et al., 2014) . The government of Nepal has identified cooperative as a pure community organization with strong faith on self-sustaining, democratic and self-governed institutions. Such convictions result a poor supervision, and therefore, the unethical practice of cooperatives has groomed recently (Bharadwaj, 2012) . Besides that, operating under Ministry of Cooperatives and Poverty Alleviation, Department of Cooperatives has been regulating the overall functioning of NC societies. Though there are 38 division offices and 6 training centers across the country (DOC, 2014, P.23), increasing cooperatives density, few numbers of division office staff, poor institutional arrangements, lack of standard regulation system, etc. have caused regulations less effective. Though central bank and Basel Committees on Bank Supervision have forwarded a framework to regulate capital bases and credit risk, legal and administrative provisions imposed to the cooperative are not standard as banking regulations. In this regard, cooperative regulations seem to be breakable.
On the one hand, cooperatives are operating in prioritized and marginal sectors, playing a significant role in capital formation and regional development, influencing in economic indicators, etc. if got failure, it may trigger a multiple failures in the economy, and on the other hand lack of permanent capital and risky allocation of total assets increase the probability of bankruptcy, credit default, operational failure of it. Pertaining to those facts, this research work has entirely connected with the research questions such as: What are the core determinants that affect the permanent capital strength of NC societies? To what extent leverage risk (as measured by CAR) has been affected by profitability, efficiency, and organizational factors such as earning distribution pattern, type of cooperative, and size? And, what are the policy implications of those determinants?
We have presented the remainder of the article as: discussing past study relevant to present study in part 2, explaining the methodology in part 3, discussing the results in part 4, and finally, concluding the study report in part 5.
Review of literature
A CAR is the rate of primary capital coverage per unit of asset hold by a DI. It is considered that higher the covering rate, the sound financial strength and stability of DI (Al-Tamimi & Obeidat, 2013, P. 44) . Bank for International Settlements has forwarded a minimum threshold of 8% CAR for each DI. However, in many cases a DI cannot maintain the required level during the financial and banking services offered by it. This could be harmful at some point in rapidly changing economic and financial services industry (Williams, 2011, P. 223) . Likewise, higher capital bases are required for a DIs in order to have crucial public confidence on it. Capital bases are considered as a state of wellbeing for a DI. It represents the prime factor while shaping DIs' perception by depositors and other stakeholders. Moreover, the government has also interest on CAR to maintain financial stability, allow smooth flow of liquidity, and reduce the likelihood of failure of DI (Aspal & Nazneen, 2014, P. 28) .
A financial system can perform significantly better in open market economy by increasing the availability of funds and allowing risk diversification through efficient channeling of funds (Bekaert et al. 2000 ). An efficient financial system can effectively mobilize and allocate resources leading to strong economic growth (Bhetuwal, 2007) . It is also suggested that governments should lead in promoting institutional arrangements for that. In recent years, the agency related issues and the role of intermediating companies are great concern of issues for various reasons such as involving of abusive practices, facilitating corporate abuses, misusing private information, etc. which show an underlying market imperfections in financial systems (Adelman, 1999) . Furthermore, Imperfect financial markets make external finance costly and reduce investment. Recent evidence suggests that the collective decision process in the management of major financial firms harms indicative individuals (Walter, 2003) . In the vary context, argument supports for a strong need of regulation due to increase in fund intermediaries function done by all types of DI. Mustafa et al. (2011) suggests a solid risk management depends on the legal, regulatory and institutional environment. Accordingly, solving agency issues such as adverse selection problem, frauds, malpractices, etc. the role of government has increased to the intervention of internal managerial affairs to price management of fund intermediating firms (NEF, 2013) . But regulators of NC do not have proper authority that they can only suggest against a serious case such as granting Rs 38 million loans without collateral to the board member from total Rs 40 million deposits collected by a particular cooperative (Karki et al., 2013) .
A risk can affect DIs profitability and financial health adversely. Thus, Basel II intended to improve safety and the soundness of the financial system by placing increased emphasis on banks own internal control and risk management process and models (Goyal & Agrawal, 2009) . Mostly banks and financial institution are applying Basel system for risk management, but the NCs are not. Moreover, World Council of Credit Union (WOCCU) recommends that credit unions should apply Basel system only if government is regulating already based on it. This is because credit unions are not generally supervised. If situation demands, adopting Basel will definably improve the capital base of a credit union. However, former to applying Basel II, the credit unions should be given chance to comment on the new regulatory requirement (WOCCU , 2008) . Meanwhile, WOCCU suggests for adopting PEARLS system in credit union than Basel. PEARLS system stands for Protection, Effective Financial Structure, Asset Quality, Rates of Return and Costs, Liquidity, and Signs of Growth. Under this framework, a credit union's financial ratios are taken in account, and benchmarked in presume indicators. CAMELS rating system is also applying to benchmark the performance and health of DIs. The ratings are assigned on a scale from 1 to 5. A DI with rating of 1 or 2 is considered as poor performer, and subjects to a supervisory concern, while DI with rating of 3, 4, or 5 is considered as moderate to the best performer (Lopez, 1999) .
A number of empirical studies have suggested the influences of CAR of DIs on financial performances, efficiency and organizational attributes. Gezu (2014) studied 8 Ethiopian commercial banks by taking sample period of 2002 to 2013, and found significant positive causal relationship on Non performing loan to gross loan ratio (NPL) of return on assets (ROA) and tax rate, but significant negative causal relationship on NPL of CAR, return on equity (ROE) and loan rate. Similarly, Shingjergji & Hyseni (2015) findings also support the negative relationship between NPL and CAR. Moreover, the direction shows by the causation between CAR and liquidity position is inconsistent with Abusharba et al. (2014) and Büyükşalvarcı & Abdioğlu (2011) , but consistent with Abusharba et al. (2014) and Bateni et al. (2014) (2013), Bateni et al. (2014) , etc. studies. According to the Nuviyanti & Anggono (2014) study, the CAR is negatively influenced by net interest margin (NIM), but Kosmidou et al. (2003) , Aktas et al. (2015) , etc. studies suggest a positive relationship between them. The stochastic relationship between CAR and financial performance suggested by past study is not seemed to be uniform. In some cases, the past findings are conflicting to each other, and in other cases findings are supporting to each other. Therefore, for the NC society a null hypothesis can be stated as: Hypothesis I: There is no significant association between CAR and profitability of a cooperative. Again, Aspal & Nazneen (2014) found a positive stochastic variance between CAR and Management efficiency, but Shingjergji & Hyseni (2015) and Odunga et al. (2013) suggested a positive variance between CAR and CD, and CAR and operating efficiency. Based on this contrasting result next hypothesis has been formulated as: Hypothesis II: There is no significant association between CAR and efficiency of a cooperative. Bateni et al. (2014) showed a direct stochastic variance betweens CAR and liquid ratio, and CAR and equity ratio, but an inverse stochastic variance between CAR and size. Based on these findings next hypothesis is formulated as: Hypothesis III: There is no significant association between CAR and firm specific attributes of a cooperative.
Form preceding survey statement of past study shows that there is a number of studies regarding CAR, regulation, problem, etc. of DIs, but mostly in case of banks and financial institutions those are subject to central bank regulation. It seems that there is a poor availability of such literatures in credit unions and cooperatives enterprises. We belief this study may fill a research gap regarding microfinance regulation.
Methodology Data and sampling
We used secondary data collected from annual audited financial statement of cooperatives. Kathmandu, being capital city, people from all around the country are living and working here. The demographic and economic heterogeneity gives resonance strata to do sampling. Assuming all Nepal as population for the study, Kathmandu district is selected as sample. Kathmandu has a variety of cooperatives such as small, medium, large, multipurpose (MPC), saving and credit (SAC), women, agricultural, business, trade, etc. MPC and SAC are providing banking services. In this regard, we selected a sample of 126 co-operatives (i. 
Variables
Capital Adequacy Ratio (CAR): The CAR is a measure of a depositor's ability to absorb insolvency losses by calculating the ratio of permanent capital to risk weighted assets. Central bank keeps an eye on the CAR of banks so that bank can be protected from insolvency risk by holding adequate long term capital. But, in cooperative such provision is lacking, and therefore risk weights of cooperatives' assets are not defined. We calculated CAR as total capital other than core deposit to total assets. This can be a proxy for a gross estimation of long term capital strength and credibility of cooperative to protect against risk arises from high degree of financial leverage. Return on Assets (ROA): ROA is the ratio of net income to total assets of a firm. It measures efficiency of the business in using its assets to generate after tax net income. ROA indicates the amount of rupees earned on each rupee of assets. Thus higher value of ROA shows that a business is more profitable (Brealey et al., 2011) . We calculated ROA as:
Return on Shareholders' Equity (ROE): ROE measures the ability of a firm to generate net profits per unit of equity capital invested by shareholders in a firm (Brealey et al., 2011; Penman, 2009 Where, ROE, NPM, NIM and ROA are profitability ratios. The i represents firm identification, t represents the year identification, and ei represents the errors term in the equation. While testing of hypothesis I, higher CAR variable implies less risky but also expected to generate low degree of ROE by multiplying ROA by lower equity multiplier (i.e. equity multiplier=total assets/equity). Thus, it is assumed to be positive relationship between CAR and profitability ratios other than ROE.
Efficiency Model CARit= α+β1 AUit+β2 CDit + ei ……………………..B2
Where, AU and CD are efficiency ratios. While formulating of hypothesis II, the past studies suggested the conflicting relationship between efficiency and leverage variables. The model is therefore defined to seek the influences of efficiency variables on leverage risk of NCs.
Organizational Attributes Model CARit= α+β1 Divit +β2 InTAit +β3 D1it + ei ……………………..B3
Where, Div, In TA and D1 are the organizational attribute variables. An increase in dividend rate reduces the permanent capital of cooperative. In order to built the size there must be the higher deposit collection, and thus reduces the permanent capital ratio. An MPC do other business along with banking services. For that, there need to be more capital strength as non-financial firm. To test hypothesis III, it is thus expected to have negative influences of Div, InTA, and D1 in CAR.
We also did stepwise ordinary least squares (OLS) and generalized least squares (GLS) regression analysis so that true determinates of CAR in NC society can be identified.
The descriptive statistics, correlation coefficients, and regression statistics are calculated by using SPSS 16.0 and StataSE10 applications. Moreover, structuring of tables and tabulation of data are done in Ms-excel 2007.
Data Analysis

Descriptive Analysis
The descriptive statistics of CAR for each year and for entire sample period are provided in the table 1. The distribution of CAR data is right skewed because the median is less than mean for each year. Drawn statistics of CAR suggest that long term or permanent capital of NC was 24.08 % of total assets. Standard deviation shows an average deviation of CAR was ±14.78% from the estimated value of mean. Similarly, NCs' maximum and minimum CAR rates were 94.3% and -7.21% respectively for entire sample. The minimum CAR must be 10% for bank and financial institutions of Nepal those are subject to central bank regulation (CAR, 2007) . Moreover, average, minimum and maximum CAR rates of Nepalese commercial bank in 2014 were 9.024%, 2.02%, and 13% respectively (NRB, 2014, P.16-17) . Though NCs' CAR seems to be greater commercial banks in average, the maximum and minimum scores show that the NCs' CAR was fluctuated more than commercial banks' CAR. NCs are collecting and investing funds from their own members only. In some case, regular deposit from members were considering as permanent source of capital. Due to this reason, the CAR score was seemed to be up to 94.3%. Furthermore, the minimum CAR score of -17.2% suggests a poor level of permanent capital. Moreover, negative pattern of minimum CAR had been improved from 2011. In comparison of the scores between SAC and MPC for entire sample, the SAC had lower CAR and fluctuation than MPC. The mean CAR was highest in 2011 and lowest in 2013, but seemed to be quite consistent during the sampling period. 
Correlation Analysis
We used Pearson correlation coefficient to seek a linear relationship between dependent and independent variables. The statistics are presented in table 3. Derivation of financial ratios is helpful to draw a logical association from results. In this case, CAR is as: Total assets (TA) > TA -Deposit, and from equation 1.2, TA and Deposit have inverse effect and equity has direct effect on CAR. Thus, correlation statistics between InTA and CAR presented in table 3 shows a significant negative linear association between them. In addition, it implies that the big sized cooperatives had lower amount of permanent capital in their portfolio. (This table shows 
Table 3: Pearson Correlation Statistics of Regression Variables
Regression Analysis
In this section, we presented the results of regression equations estimated in methodology section. We estimated the statistics of each model individually, and finally, we used all independent variables to estimate the four steps OLS and GLS statistics. The table 4 represents the statistics and model summary of financial performance model B1. The R2 indicates how much the dependent variable (i.e. CAR) can be explained by the financial performance variables such as ROE, NIM, ROA, and NPM. In this case, combined efforts of regressed variables have explained CAR by 27.6%, and remaining 72.4% (i.e.1-27.6%) by other factors. Standard error of model B1 indicates that the average variability of observed value around the fitted line of regression is ±12.2. The F score is 50.694 which is significance at 0 percent. This indicates the rejection of null hypothesis I, i.e. leverage risk of cooperatives is affected by profitability variables of NCs. But, only NIM and ROE are significant enough to predict the CAR, since P values of t scores of ROA and NPM are higher than 0.05. Since earning assets is a part of TA, and equation 3.2 shows that NIM is also inversely related with Deposit and TA like CAR, so supporting the process, CAR is significantly influenced by NIM in positive direction. The result is consistent with Kosmidou et al. (2003) , but inconsistent with Nuviyanti & Anggono (2011) . At the same time, higher CAR tends to be less leverage effect in capital structure and thus reduces the ROE while deriving it from ROA, thus, CAR is significantly influenced by ROE in negative direction. But if a firm has negative profits the result should be in opposite of that. Our study showed that the negative variance between CAR and ROE. The result is consistent with Büyükşalvarcı & Abdioğlu (2011 ), Al-Tamimi & Obeidat (2013 ), Nuviyanti & Anggono (2014 , Gezu (2014) , etc. studies, but inconsistent with Bateni et al. (2014) , and Dreca (2013) study. Though higher CAR reduces the return of firm, a cooperative has to optimize tradeoff between CAR and ROE to maintain strong long term insolvency position of it. The table 5 shows the regression statistics and summary of efficiency model B2. The R 2 0.513 suggests the 51.3% rate of combine explaining capacity by AU and CE regressed in the model for predicting CAR, and remaining 48.7 % (i.e.1-0.513) is explained by other variables. Standard error of the estimate of the regression model B 2 is 9.519 indicates average variability of ±9.519 from observed value around the fitted line of regression. The F score=278.634, and it is significant at 0 percent indicating hypothesis II is rejected, and suggesting efficiency variables can be explained the CAR significantly. But coefficient of predicting variables shows only coefficient of CD variable is not significantly different from 0 because its t-score is significant 0%and indicates that, overall, the coefficient of CD and constant applied are only significant enough to predict the CAR. Most probably, cooperative having adequate capital can supply more loan in case of less deposit collection too, and moreover, result also suggests cooperatives having higher CD ratio also had permanent capital. The finding is also supported by Odunga et al. (2013) study done in Kenya and Aspal & Nazneen (2014) study done in India, but opposed by Shingjergji and Hyseni (2015) study. The organizational attributes model B3 statistics and summary are presented in the table 6. The R 2 value indicates how much of the dependent variable, CAR, can be explained by the independent variables such as D2, InTA, and Div. In this case, 12.9% can be explained from D2, InTA, Div, and remaining 87.9% (i.e.1-12.9%) by other factors. The F score 12.85 is significant at 0% indicating in overall model is significant to predict CAR. This suggests rejection of null hypothesis III. But not all variables used in model, coefficient of constant and InTA are only significant enough for predicting CAR. This suggests managers should see change in leverage risk while increasing the size. It also implies the big sized cooperatives did not have adequate long term capital, and they are in higher degree of solvency risk exposures. The finding is supported by finding of Bateni et al. (2014) , Aktas et al. (2015) , Aspal & Nazneen (2014) studies, and refused by finding of Shingjergji & Hyseni (2015) study. A big sized cooperative pools the large amount of public fund. Thus, regulatory bodies have to keep eyes on this node to regulate capital structure of the cooperatives for protecting public funds.
The table 7 shows the stepwise regression statistics of OLS and GLS estimates. In a set of panel data, the OLS treats each observation as a unique and new observation, but the GLS considers the time series and cross-sectional identifications while estimating the regression statistics. In the forth step, model has included CD, NIM, D1, and AU respectively. Rests of the variables used in study were excluded by models. This suggests the core determinants of CAR for the NC societies are CD ratio, NIM rate, types of cooperative, and AU respectively. For the step first, coefficient of CD shows that an increase in 1% CD ratio of industry leads to an average increase of 0.37% and 0.4% CAR assuming OLS and GLS respectively. In the step second, combined influencing capacity of CD and NIM for predicting CAR is 55.9%. The R 2 values show including more variables in each step, model predicting capacity has also increased. In most of the case, coefficient of GLS estimates t scores are higher than coefficient of OLS estimates t scores. This shows CAR is significant with year and firm specific identifications associating with other predicators in the model. Model and variables used by each step are significant enough to influence dependent variables since their F scores or Chisquare scores are significant at 0%. Remaining independent variables used in study are excluded. Data are extracted from audited annual reports of respective cooperatives. Con.=Constant predictors; R 2 =Coefficient of Determinates;*** Significant at the 0%; **Significant at the 1%; and *Significant at the 5%, figures below predictors coefficient are t scores of respective predictors)
Step 1 Step 2 Step 3 Step 
Conclusion
The NCs have considerable contribution in prioritized, marginal and regional development. Moreover, sound and efficient operations of them are crucial current issue. The CAR is the indicator of financial strength and stability of DI. We did descriptive, correlation, and regression analysis by using an unbalance panel data of 126 co-operatives from 2009 to 2013 to evaluate the determinants of the CAR. We have explored a number of facts those can be concluded as:
In average, CAR is greater in cooperative societies than commercial banks, but the maximum and the minimum scores show cooperatives' CAR was more inconstant than commercial banks' CAR. The facts from descriptive statistics suggest that some cooperatives have operated against the cooperative laws. This might be arisen due to number of reason such as cooperative members' level of education, unqualified cooperative managers, poor regulations accomplished by government, etc. The relationship between ROE and equity and between CAR and equity seems to be opposite. Hence, higher CAR reduces the equity multiplier, and thus reduces the ROE while deriving it from ROA. Regression and correlation results show the negative variance between CAR and ROE. The findings are steady with Büyükşalvarcı & Abdioğlu (2011 ), Al-Tamimi & Obeidat (2013 , Nuviyanti & Anggono (2014) , Gezu (2014) , etc. studies, and conflicting with Bateni et al. (2014) , and Dreca (2013) study suggestinga cooperative has to optimize tradeoff between CAR and ROE to maintain balance between long term insolvency position and profitability. The NIM can define CAR significantly in positive direction. The relationship is consistent with Kosmidou et al. (2003) , but fluctuating with Nuviyanti & Anggono (2011).The findings from efficiency model suggest cooperatives having higher CD ratio also had permanent capital supporting Odunga et al. (2013) study done in Kenya and Aspal & Nazneen (2014) study done in India, but opposing by Shingjergji and Hyseni (2015) study. From the firm attribute model, coefficient of InTA is significant enough for predicting CAR suggesting managers should watch behavior of leverage risk while increasing the size which is consistent with Bateni et al. (2014) , Aktas et al. (2015) , Aspal & Nazneen (2014) studies, and inconsistent with Shingjergji & Hyseni (2015) study. Regarding the level of risk on the large amount of public fund collected by big sized, regulatory bodies have to regulate capital structure of the cooperatives promptly for protecting the public funds.
